{"id":1360,"date":"2024-04-24T14:46:42","date_gmt":"2024-04-24T12:46:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=1360"},"modified":"2024-05-27T19:48:18","modified_gmt":"2024-05-27T17:48:18","slug":"financial-sanction-and-the-role-of-swift","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/04\/24\/financial-sanction-and-the-role-of-swift\/","title":{"rendered":"Financial Sanction and the Role of SWIFT"},"content":{"rendered":"

The authors summarize a longer article appeared on an academic journal, the Journal of Economic Perspectives: \u201cFinancial Sanctions, SWIFT, and the Architecture of the International Payment System,\u201d Cipriani, Goldberg, La Spada, 37(1), 2023.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

The role of financial sanctions has been increasing over the last years. One of the most effective measures is the exclusion of sanctioned countries from the SWIFT network, which facilitates economic and financial transactions. However, new alternative systems to SWIFT are being created.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Financial sanctions—namely, sanctions that restrict the ability of countries, businesses, and sometimes even individuals to send or receive payments, buy or sell financial assets, or provide custodial services—have been used for decades. Indeed, the first notable example of sanctions after World Wort II—the US sanctions against North Korea in 1950—had a financial component, with the Department of the Treasury forbidding any financial transactions with the country. Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows, the importance of financial sanctions has been increasing over the years, with over 40 percent of sanction episodes having a financial component in 2010-2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 1—Sanctions since World War II<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

This figure displays the number of sanctions within each decade by sanction type. Sanctions are only counted in the first decade of implementation. Joint sanctions have both economic (e.g., import restrictions) and financial (e.g., asset freezes, investment screens) elements. The black line represents the percentage of sanctions with a financial component over time (right axis). <\/span><\/i>Source: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2023, using the Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et al., 2020)<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Recently, a particular type of financial sanction has become more prominent: restricting access to the infrastructure that allows the execution of international payments. Such sanctions have sometimes included disconnecting a country from the messaging network maintained by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Because there are few and limited alternatives to SWIFT, these sanctions may be particularly effective in limiting a country\u2019s ability to send or receive payments, and therefore in preventing the targeted country from engaging in any economic, commercial, or financial activity with the rest of the world. In this article, we explain how the system of international payments works, the role of SWIFT within this system, and how access to SWIFT has been used to impose sanctions.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Infrastructure of Cross-Border Payments<\/b><\/h3>\n

Within a country, payments normally settle on the books of the central bank, with which most banks hold accounts. Suppose Andrea, who is banking with Bank A, wants to send 10 euros to Beatrice, who is banking with Bank B. Bank A will then instruct the central bank to decrease its central-bank account by 10 euros and credit the same amount to Bank B\u2019s account; Bank B will then credit the money to Beatrice\u2019s account.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Central banks, however, do not normally allow foreign banks to access their payment system. For this reason, cross-border payments normally happen through \u201ccorrespondent banks.\u201d If Andrea lives in Italy and Beatrice lives in the US, Andrea\u2019s bank\u2014Bank A\u2014will use its account at Bank C, a bank based in the US, to transfer the money; that is, Bank C works as a \u201ccorrespondent bank\u201d for Bank A. The correspondent bank will keep the record of the money it keeps on behalf of Bank A in a so-called \u201cVostro\u201d account (whereas Bank A\u2019s record of the money it keeps with the US bank is called a \u201cNostro\u201d account.) As Figure 2 shows, Bank A will instruct Bank C to transfer money to Beatrice\u2019s US bank through the US central bank, the Federal Reserve. In some cases, especially for smaller countries, many correspondent banks, based in different countries, are involved in the settlement of a cross-border payment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 2: Cross-border Payments and Correspondent Banking<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Source: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2023<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

The Role of SWIFT<\/b><\/h3>\n

For most of the 20<\/span>th<\/span> century, messages between banks to exchange the necessary information for cross-border payments were sent first via cable and then via Telex, a teleprinter network that originally used the existing telegraph and telephone networks. However, Telex messages were unformatted, without pre-specified standards, complicating the transmission of clear payment, settlement, and transfer instructions between financial institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 1973, a consortium of banks from 15 countries founded SWIFT to facilitate the transmission of financial instructions. From the very beginning, SWIFT accomplished two purposes. First, it developed—and continues to develop to this very day\u2014a set of standards for financial messages, increasing reliability and precision in the exchange of financial information. For example, we are all familiar with the ISO 13616, which uniquely identifies bank accounts across the world through the International Bank Account Number (IBAN), for which SWIFT has registration authority. Second, SWIFT developed a network for the transmission of financial information. In contrast to Telex, SWIFT messages do not travel through regular telephone and cable lines, but rather SWIFT uses a different network run from three data centers (one in the Netherlands, one in Switzerland, and one in the U.S.)<\/span><\/p>\n

The SWIFT network allows the transmission of messages between financial institutions both within and across countries. Importantly, SWIFT has not replaced correspondent banking. Rather, it provides a medium through which the information needed for correspondent banking can be easily transmitted. Figure 3 expands on Figure 2 above, highlighting the role of SWIFT in the transmission of information between financial institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure3: The Role of SWIFT in Cross-border Payments<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Source: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2023<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Although SWIFT membership is generally restricted to banks, dealers, and investment managers, a much broader set of financial institutions can access its network. Figure 4 shows how the importance of the SWIFT network has grown over the years. In 2021, the number of messages sent through SWIFT surpassed 10 billion, from only 300 million in 1990. It is important to remark that SWIFT is neither a bank nor a financial market utility (like a clearing house or a settlement system). Nevertheless, due to its central role in the payment system, the National Bank of Belgium, where the company is based, oversees the institution, supported by the G10 central banks.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 4: Number of Institutions Connected to SWIFT and Number of SWIFT Messages<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The black line is the number of institutions connected to SWIFT; the blue line is the number of SWIFT messages (right axis) <\/span><\/i>Source: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2023<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

SWIFT, Financial Sanction, and the Emergency of SWIFT Competitors<\/b><\/h3>\n

Whereas SWIFT standards are public—and therefore their use cannot be subject to sanctions—SWIFT can deny countries and their businesses access to its network based on international sanctions. Such an action impairs not only a country\u2019s access to the system of cross-border payment, but also the transmission of financial messages between financial institutions within the country, unless a back-up system is in place. This can create tremendous havoc to a country\u2019s financial system and to its real economy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since SWIFT is based in Belgium, any action it takes must comply with Belgian and EU law. Moreover, SWIFT has always strived to act as a neutral service provider, refraining from taking policy decisions that exclude countries or businesses from the network. For instance, in 2004, SWIFT resisted pressures from the EU to disconnect Myanmar from the network; similarly, it objected to and did not comply with the 2014 non-binding EU Parliament resolution to exclude Russia from SWIFT, passed after the Russian invasion of Crimea.<\/span><\/p>\n

SWIFT has historically complied with EU legislative or regulatory actions regarding access to its network. After SWIFT\u2019s refusal to abide by the non-binding EU Parliament resolution in 2014, the European Council passed a binding resolution in 2022, sanctioning Russian and Belorussian banks\u2019 access to SWIFT, and SWIFT complied with this resolution. Similarly, in 2012, the U.S. Congress authorized the President to impose sanctions on institutions that provided services to designated Iranian financial institutions, which would have included SWIFT. One month later, the EU adopted a similar regulation, forbidding SWIFT from allowing access to some Iranian banks, and SWIFT complied with the EU rule. In 2017, SWIFT disconnected some North Korean banks from the network, following a decision to prohibit such activity from Belgian authorities. Sometimes, SWIFT has even acted when not required by EU and Belgian law. When the US withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018, it gave SWIFT six months to disconnect the newly re-sanctioned Iranian institutions. Although it was not forced to do so, as the EU had not withdrawn from the treaty, SWIFT decided to comply \u201cin the interest of stability and integrity of the wider global financial system.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Since SWIFT has been used as a tool of financial sanction by the US, the EU, and their western allies, some countries, in particular China and Russia, have attempted to develop messaging systems of their own, to be able to bypass the SWIFT network. Importantly, most of these systems still use SWIFT standards, which are public. Although these systems have not reached the scale of SWIFT, they do provide a back-up system in case access to SWIFT were curtailed.<\/span><\/p>\n

For instance, after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia created the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (STFM), which uses its own network to transfer messages with SWIFT standards. Several banks are connected to SFTM\u2014not only Russian and Belorussian, but also from Western Europe and other countries. Similarly, in 2015, China set up the Chinese Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). Similar to Russia\u2019s STFM, CIPS uses the SWIFT standards. In contrast to STFM, CIPS provides not only a messaging network but also settlement services in renminbi, the Chinese currency, with the aim of expanding its use in international financial transactions. Several Russian banks are connected to CIPS, which jointly with SFTM can provide Russia a way to evade Western sanctions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is worth noting that both SFTM and CIPS are still relatively small. Currently, SFTM mainly processes messages within Russia. Although CIPS has been growing at a fast pace since its inception, a large proportion of CIPS transactions are still settled using the SWIFT network, as many banks do not have access to the CIPS terminal. Therefore, at the moment, neither system is likely to provide a viable alternative to SWIFT. They are, however, providing both Russia and China with valuable expertise in setting and managing cross-border transactions, as well as with some form of back-up should access to SWIFT be sanctioned by the US and the EU.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusions<\/b><\/h3>\n

Financial sanctions have been often used in addition to standard economic sanctions in international relationships, with their importance increasing over time. Sanctions that prevent a country from accessing the system of international payments can be particularly damaging, as they cut the country off from economic and financial activity. Recently, these kinds of sanctions have been at the forefront of the debate, especially in the West, focusing on disconnecting sanctioned countries and businesses from SWIFT, the main messaging system allowing communication across international markets. As a reaction, some non-Western countries have set in place their own systems. Although these systems are not currently a viable alternative to SWIFT because of their small scale of activity, they could become so in the near future, curtailing the ability of Western countries to impose financial sanctions.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

* Marco Cipriani is the head of the Money and Payments Studies Department in the Research Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from New York University in 2002. <\/span>Gabriele La Spada is a financial research advisor the Money and Payments Studies Department in the Research Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University in May 2015.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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