{"id":13675,"date":"2026-06-26T15:40:35","date_gmt":"2026-06-26T13:40:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=13675"},"modified":"2026-06-26T15:40:35","modified_gmt":"2026-06-26T13:40:35","slug":"who-will-hold-the-world-together-after-america","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2026\/06\/26\/who-will-hold-the-world-together-after-america\/","title":{"rendered":"Who Will Hold the World Together After America?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The international system is undergoing a profound crisis, marked by the decline of the rules-based order and the emergence of open competition among the major powers. Middle powers are attempting to carve out a role for themselves in preserving cooperation and stability through multilateral agreements and new coalitions. Yet the retreat of the United States from its traditional stabilizing role\u2014and its growing preference for coercion over cooperation\u2014has made this task far more difficult. The European Union is a strong candidate to lead a coalition of countries sharing similar values and interests. But in trade, finance, and security alike, its room for independent action remains limited. The resilience of the global order will ultimately depend on these states’ ability to coordinate without provoking new tensions, while keeping channels of dialogue open with their historic ally.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Today I want to speak to you about the breakdown of the world order, the end of a beautiful story and the beginning of a brutal reality in which great-power geopolitics is no longer constrained by any rules (…). Every day we are reminded that we live in an era of great-power rivalry. That the rules-based order is fading. That the strong can do as they please and the weak must endure what they must. But I would also remind you that other countries\u2014particularly middle powers such as Canada\u2014are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that reflects our values: respect for human rights, sustainable growth, solidarity, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of states (…).”<\/p>\n

These words are taken from the speech delivered by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20. It was a powerful address that resonated widely. Yet, in the unsettling days of the new war involving Iran, it is far from clear how middle powers might realistically organize themselves to create a new international order. Perhaps the world has already descended too deeply into chaos for any new order to be rebuilt.<\/p>\n

There Was an Hegemonic Country Behind the “Beautiful Story” of the World Order<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Let us nevertheless begin by reflecting on the first part of Carney’s speech: the “breakdown of the beautiful story of the world order,” understood as a global public good.<\/p>\n

There is no doubt that this represents an extremely serious development, made even more troubling by the growing rivalry among the world’s major powers.<\/p>\n

Yet the order to which the Canadian Prime Minister refers was, in reality, what the economic historian Charles Kindleberger would have described as hegemonic stability: an international system built upon\u2014and sustained by\u2014the hegemony of the United States. In his studies of the postwar monetary system, Kindleberger emphasized the essential role of cooperation among central banks and argued that an integrated international economy could function only if supported by a hegemonic power.<\/p>\n

Indeed, the institutional framework that emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference\u2014and which governed first the Western economy and later the global economy for decades\u2014was characterized, at least until the last decade, by undisputed American leadership. The United States, however, chose to limit its own freedom of action through a system of rules that bound all participants, itself included. The underlying principle was that such an order generated collective benefits in the form of stability\u2014a genuine global public good\u2014and was therefore preferable to predatory behavior. In other words, it represented the model of a self-restrained hegemon. According to Kindleberger, once the dominant power begins to weaken, international order and stability inevitably deteriorate.<\/p>\n

Barry Eichengreen, while also writing primarily about the international monetary system, reaches a somewhat different conclusion. He argues that a group of countries pursuing similar objectives can collectively provide global public goods through stable coalitions. For such coalitions to endure, however, they require clear agreements and, ideally, institutions capable of enforcing them. Eichengreen points to at least two historical examples in which international order survived despite the weakening of the hegemonic power. The first concerns the final phase of the Gold Standard. Although Britain remained the dominant power and sterling continued to serve as the world’s leading currency, London no longer possessed sufficient strength to preserve monetary stability on its own. It therefore cooperated with the Banque de France and Germany’s Reichsbank to maintain the system.<\/p>\n

A second example emerged during the crisis of the so-called dollar standard around 1960. The United States was no longer capable of stabilizing the international monetary system by itself and consequently relied on cooperation with other countries through institutional arrangements such as the Gold Pool, under which the world’s principal central banks coordinated interventions to stabilize the dollar price of gold.<\/p>\n

The Role of the WTO and the G20<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The same logic can also be applied to international trade. Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, the World Trade Organization originated as expressions of American self-restraint. Yet within that very order, new economic powers gradually emerged. Although initially marginal, they eventually began eroding U.S. hegemony while formally remaining within the existing rules-based system.<\/p>\n

As Mark Carney himself has observed, the idea of a perfectly rules-based international order has always been something of a fairy tale, since hegemonic powers have repeatedly violated those rules\u2014the United States no less than China. Those violations, however, were generally deliberate and limited. They did not challenge the overall architecture of the system itself. It was precisely the explicit\u2014or tacit\u2014cooperation among the major powers that ensured the system’s resilience.<\/p>\n

China itself, despite hardly being a model of rule compliance, has paradoxically presented itself in recent months as a defender of the existing order. Better to have stable rules\u2014even rules that are occasionally violated\u2014than to descend into chaos, a condition far more damaging to international trade. In this sense, the rules-based system continues to survive thanks to the implicit cooperation of at least two hegemonic powers and the continued participation of other major actors\u2014not least the European Union, one of the world’s principal middle powers.<\/p>\n

Another instructive example comes from the 2008 global financial crisis and the creation of the G20.<\/p>\n

Once it became clear that the global economy had become too integrated to ignore the emerging economies\u2014which held a substantial share of the trade surpluses financing Western financial markets\u2014the world moved from a model centered on a single hegemon to one based on broader cooperation. That broader framework contributed materially to managing a crisis that, ironically enough, had originated in the very heart of the hegemonic power itself. Middle powers, therefore, can play a decisive role even when the international order has its origins in hegemonic leadership.<\/p>\n

In Search of New Coalitions<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The situation described by Carney is fundamentally different because today’s international order has been fractured by the hegemon itself. Certainly, previous American administrations were not immune from actions capable of destabilizing the system. One need only recall Washington’s refusal to approve appointments to the WTO Appellate Body, effectively paralyzing the organization’s dispute settlement mechanism. Today, however, Donald Trump has chosen to wield the axe. His objective is openly to abandon cooperation within coalitions and agreements that he neither recognizes nor finds compatible with American interests, replacing partnership\u2014even with long-standing allies\u2014with an overtly predatory approach. The hegemon’s power, once used to consolidate and lead coalitions of countries pursuing common objectives, has instead become an instrument of coercion. The benefits it derives no longer stem from protecting and maintaining a global public good, but from exploiting its superior power to impose penalties and sanctions on its partners.<\/p>\n

At this point, the problem changes fundamentally: can middle powers restore an international order when the hegemon itself is intent on destroying it and imposing its will through force? And, above all, through what coalitions and with what room for maneuver?<\/p>\n

In my view, the answer depends on three factors. The first concerns the size of the potential alliances among middle powers. For such coalitions to succeed, a significant number of countries must choose cooperation. Every nation acting alone\u2014or in small, fragmented groups\u2014would lead only to modest and costly outcomes. The second factor is the coalition’s stability and effectiveness. Will the global trading system remain integrated, or will it fragment\u2014for example, into separate Western market economies and China, or even into a deeper rupture involving the so-called Global South? The third factor is the cost of distancing oneself from the United States, which depends on the fact that the various spheres of economic and political interaction are deeply interconnected.<\/p>\n

America’s Advantages and the Leverage of Middle Powers<\/strong><\/h3>\n

There is undoubtedly some room for maneuver in international trade, where the United States accounts for roughly 17 percent of global trade. However, one must also consider other strategically important domains\u2014from finance to defense\u2014in which the United States continues to occupy a dominant position.<\/p>\n

To some extent, an informal coalition has already begun to emerge. Every country, with the exception of the United States, has continued to operate within the existing rules-based trading system and, apart from a handful of highly specific measures, has refrained from raising tariffs. This has been true both in response to American trade measures\u2014with China being the principal exception\u2014and in relations among these countries themselves. Taken as a whole, therefore, every major country\u2014with the exception of the United States and, naturally, Russia and its closest allies\u2014has continued to operate within a broadly free-trade environment.<\/p>\n

It is true that industrial policy and technological sovereignty have become increasingly prominent, while security concerns now tend to outweigh considerations relating to international trade, encouraging a gradual drift toward protectionism. Even so, the rules-based system invoked by Mark Carney has so far remained intact, at least among the middle powers and the new Chinese hegemon.<\/p>\n

Whether it will continue to do so in light of developments surrounding the conflict with Iran remains to be seen.<\/p>\n

Indeed, there have even been some institutional advances. One example is the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur. Strictly speaking, it is not an alliance among middle powers, yet it nonetheless represents integration between two enormous geographic regions encompassing approximately 800 million people and a significant share of both global GDP and world trade.<\/p>\n

Another important development is the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), an appellate arbitration mechanism established within the framework of the World Trade Organization to resolve trade disputes among participating countries as an alternative to the Appellate Body, whose functioning has been paralyzed by the United States. This mechanism is particularly significant precisely because it was created in response to Washington’s blockage of the WTO and because it brings together many of the world’s leading middle powers, including the European Union, Canada, China, and the United Kingdom. The MPIA has already resolved\u2014or is currently examining\u2014a number of important disputes, including the disagreement between the European Union and Turkey over pharmaceutical imports and the intellectual property dispute between China and the European Union.<\/p>\n

Can the European Union Become the Leading Middle Power?<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Naturally, an important question arises: which of the world’s principal middle powers is willing to assume leadership in building these coalitions? More specifically, it matters greatly whether that leadership comes from the European Union or from China. The European Union possesses institutions and a political framework whose very foundation is the rule of law. If anything, Europe’s problem is an excess of regulation\u2014but that is another matter altogether. China, by contrast, frequently supports the existence of international rules only to circumvent them when convenient.<\/p>\n

In an article published last year on VoxEU<\/em>, economists Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry identified three areas in which the European Union could exercise genuine leadership by fostering new coalitions among countries sharing common interests and values: international trade, environmental policy, global taxation.<\/p>\n

In the field of trade, progress has already been made through the maintenance of relatively low tariffs, the conclusion of the Mercosur agreement, and the launch of new partnerships, including negotiations with India. Nevertheless, stronger and more explicit European leadership\u2014and, above all, greater unity among EU member states\u2014remains essential. In the other two areas, however, the path forward appears considerably more challenging, not least because these objectives are not equally shared across the Union.<\/p>\n

If it is therefore possible to build coalitions that exclude the United States, the central issue becomes the cost of dissociation. Several scholars have pointed out that distancing oneself from a predatory hegemon in an uncoordinated fashion\u2014for example through aggressive trade policies or openly hostile initiatives toward the United States\u2014could trigger a vicious cycle, producing increasingly restrictive effects on markets and international trade. It is no coincidence that only China\u2014the other contemporary hegemonic power\u2014has responded forcefully to Trump’s tariffs.<\/p>\n

The principal concern is the possibility of American retaliation in areas extending well beyond international trade. While the United States’ share of global trade is relatively limited, its position remains dominant in other strategic sectors, most notably defense and finance, thanks to the central role of the U.S. dollar and the international payments system. These are areas in which it is difficult to imagine viable coalitions that exclude Washington. American retaliation therefore represents a credible threat, ranging from Trump’s repeated suggestions that NATO could effectively come to an end to the arguments advanced by Stephen Miran, Chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, who has defended tariffs by pointing to the costs the United States allegedly bears as issuer of the world’s reserve currency.<\/p>\n

In short, coalitions are possible, but they are difficult to sustain in the face of a hostile hegemon that continues to dominate critical sectors of the global economy. Nevertheless, opportunities remain to preserve spaces for cooperation and to defend shared values. The hope is that a path of dialogue can eventually be restored. Until then, it is essential to remain steadfast, because the possibility of bringing the hegemon back onto a more constructive course will depend on the size, cohesion, and durability of the coalitions formed by the world’s middle powers.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Giorgio Barba Navaretti is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Milan; a CEPR Fellow; Distinguished Visiting Faculty at Sciences Po Paris; Chairman of the Collegio Carlo Alberto Foundation in Turin; and Scientific Director of the Luca d’Agliano Research Centre.<\/em><\/p>\n

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