{"id":13771,"date":"2026-07-16T16:15:16","date_gmt":"2026-07-16T14:15:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=13771"},"modified":"2026-07-16T16:15:16","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T14:15:16","slug":"europes-trump-card-in-the-chip-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2026\/07\/16\/europes-trump-card-in-the-chip-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe’s Trump Card in the Chip War"},"content":{"rendered":"

Semiconductors have become a geopolitical issue. Producing them\u2014or at least securing reliable access to them\u2014has become essential for achieving global economic leadership. Their strategic importance stems not so much from their direct contribution to the world economy, which remains relatively modest, but from the indispensable role they play across an enormous range of production chains. This is a point Europe should bear firmly in mind when making policy decisions in this field. Although the continent has accumulated a long-standing technological gap in the production of the most advanced chips, it remains a global leader in the machinery required to manufacture them. European Union policies should therefore focus on strengthening these segments of the value chain, consolidating the position of European firms in its most strategic links. Pursuing the illusion of complete manufacturing self-sufficiency, by contrast, would simply result in a waste of public resources.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Semiconductors have become the symbol of global technological competition. We constantly hear about the “chip war”, digital sovereignty, and strategic autonomy. Judging from media coverage, one might conclude that control over microprocessors determines the fate of advanced economies. Yet the data paint a rather different picture. For many years, the global semiconductor industry\u2014including every stage of production\u2014accounted for roughly 0.5 percent of world GDP. It is true that the market capitalisation of leading firms such as Nvidia has reached trillions of dollars. Yet Nvidia’s annual revenues amount to little more than $200 billion. Adding together the revenues of the other major producers brings the total to around $500 billion. In short, these industry giants generate revenues amounting to less than 0.5 percent of global GDP, which today stands at approximately $120 trillion.<\/p>\n

We are therefore confronted with a striking mismatch between the attention devoted to the sector and its direct economic weight. This does not, of course, mean that semiconductors are unimportant. On the contrary, they are essential\u2014but in an indirect sense. They matter not because they employ vast numbers of workers or generate a large share of global income, but because they constitute a fundamental input for an extraordinary range of products. Without semiconductors, it would be impossible to manufacture automobiles, industrial machinery, medical devices, household appliances, or smartphones. Their importance derives from the systemic role they play within global value chains.<\/p>\n

The Economic Importance of Semiconductors<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Naturally, in some countries the sector also carries considerable direct economic weight. In Taiwan, for example, semiconductor manufacturing accounts for around 15 percent of the economy’s value added, while exports of electronic circuits exceeded $220 billion in 2024\u2014equivalent to more than 25 percent of GDP. In such cases, the degree of specialisation is so high that the industry has become a structural component of the national economy. For the European Union and the United States, however, the situation is fundamentally different.<\/p>\n

Even in terms of international trade, Europe’s dependence on foreign suppliers is often overstated. The European Union imports between \u20ac40 billion and \u20ac50 billion worth of semiconductors each year, representing approximately 2 percent of total imports. By comparison, imports of energy products are almost ten times greater. The figures are broadly similar for the United States. The world’s largest importer of semiconductors, however, is by far China, with imports amounting to around \u20ac350 billion. In terms of semiconductor supply, Beijing is far more dependent on foreign producers than Europe.<\/p>\n

This is reflected in the trade balance. The European Union records only a small deficit in semiconductors, the United States enjoys a modest surplus, while China runs a very substantial deficit. Europe also possesses another major advantage: semiconductor manufacturing equipment. It produces and exports far more of these machines than it imports, generating a trade surplus of more than \u20ac20 billion.<\/p>\n

An Industry with Two Distinct Faces<\/strong><\/h3>\n

If these are the aggregate figures, it is important to recognise that there is no single “chip market”. Instead, there are two major segments, each with very different technical, economic, and geopolitical characteristics.<\/p>\n

The first consists of advanced logic chips, currently manufactured using process nodes of 5 nanometres or smaller. “Nodes” refer to the minimum size of the structures etched onto a chip\u2014that is, the distance between transistors. The smaller the number, the more miniaturised, powerful, and energy-efficient the chip becomes. These semiconductors perform billions of operations per second and are indispensable for data centres, artificial intelligence, and sophisticated military applications.<\/p>\n

The second segment comprises the so-called mature chips, manufactured using nodes ranging from 20 to 90 nanometres or larger. These are used to regulate electrical currents, control sensors, and manage motors. They are essential to the automotive industry and to manufacturing more generally.<\/p>\n

These technical differences translate into distinct economic models. Advanced chips require enormous investment in research and development and are produced within highly concentrated markets. Mature chips, by contrast, require far less research than in the past and operate in more competitive markets characterised by a wide variety of products.<\/p>\n

Virtually all of today’s concerns and debates focus almost exclusively on the most advanced chips\u2014the ones required to run artificial intelligence models. Yet this segment has undergone a profound transformation. Whereas in the past most value added came from the physical manufacture of semiconductors, today it increasingly derives from design and software. As transistor density has increased, chip architecture and design have become the industry’s true competitive frontier.<\/p>\n

It should therefore come as no surprise that Nvidia owns no semiconductor fabrication plants. It dominates the AI chip market thanks to the superiority of its chip architecture, while the actual manufacturing takes place in Taiwan.<\/p>\n

Europe in the Chip War<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Even the much-discussed “chip war” between the United States and China concerns almost exclusively the most advanced semiconductors. Washington has imposed export restrictions on chips designed in the United States in order to deny China access to cutting-edge technologies, with the declared objective of protecting national security by preventing Beijing from closing the technological gap. Yet, as we have seen, the most advanced chips are manufactured in Taiwan. How, then, can the United States prevent their export to China? The answer is straightforward: American export-control rules also apply to products based on U.S. technology. This means that the Taiwanese manufacturer producing Nvidia-designed chips must obtain authorisation from the U.S. authorities before exporting them to any third country.<\/p>\n

Where does Europe stand in the “chip war”? It is neither a leading player in the design of the most advanced semiconductors nor in their large-scale manufacture. Yet it occupies a crucial position in the global value chain thanks to the Dutch company ASML, which enjoys an almost monopolistic position in the production of the lithography equipment required to manufacture next-generation chips. Without these European machines, Asian manufacturers would be unable to produce the most advanced process nodes based on American chip designs. This is where Europe’s true strategic strength lies.<\/p>\n

Admittedly, ASML sells very little of its equipment within Europe, simply because there is little domestic demand for these machines. As a 2022 European Commission study revealed, around three-quarters of projected demand among European semiconductor manufacturers concerns chips in the 65\u201390 nanometre range. In other words, European industry predominantly produces and uses mature chips.<\/p>\n

European Policies for the Semiconductor Sector<\/h3>\n

Europe has lagged behind in this field from the very beginning. Precisely for this reason, a succession of European programmes has sought to close the gap for more than thirty years. One of the earliest initiatives, launched in 1990, was the Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative. The title itself is revealing, because at that time the ambition was to achieve process nodes measured in micrometres\u2014one thousand times larger than the nanometres discussed today. Yet neither this initiative nor those that followed achieved significant success.<\/p>\n

The issue returned to the forefront during the Covid crisis and the subsequent surge in demand for microelectronics. In 2021, chip prices soared and several industries struggled to obtain sufficient supplies to meet demand. During that period, all the world’s major economies introduced subsidy programmes for the semiconductor industry, from the United States with the CHIPS and Science Act to Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan, committing many tens of billions of dollars.<\/p>\n

The European Union sought to avoid falling even further behind by adopting the European Chips Act. Unlike the United States and several other countries, however, the EU does not possess a budget sufficiently large or flexible to allocate comparable financial resources. Consequently, the European Chips Act does not provide new funding. Instead, it introduces exemptions from state-aid rules, allowing Member States to support first-of-a-kind projects. The term was originally intended to refer to highly innovative, pioneering initiatives, but in practice it came to mean facilities or technologies being introduced for the first time in Europe, even if they were not new globally. As a result, the principal projects implemented so far have focused on semiconductors for the automotive industry, with subsidies covering, in some cases, between 40 and 50 percent of investment costs. By contrast, projects involving advanced semiconductors\u2014such as Intel’s planned fabrication plant in Germany\u2014never materialised. In the end, substantial public resources flowed into a segment characterised by relatively low profit margins, far removed from those achieved in the advanced-chip industry. To give just a few figures, margins of around 50 percent for Nvidia, 40 percent for TSMC, and 30 percent for ASML stand in sharp contrast to the 14 percent margin earned by a European automotive semiconductor producer such as Infineon.<\/p>\n

The difference in profitability reflects a deeper difference in geopolitical relevance: sectors dominated by a small number of highly profitable firms are also those that tend to possess the greatest strategic importance.<\/p>\n

Towards a Chips Act 2.0?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The current Chips Act is approaching the end of its life, and calls are already being heard\u2014particularly from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association\u2014for a second edition, a Chips Act 2.0. Once again, the objective would be to subsidise the production of mature semiconductors. Yet this is not the path towards Europe’s strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n

Instead, Europe should focus on consolidating its competitive advantage in semiconductor manufacturing equipment and in those advanced technological niches where European companies still retain global leadership. Investing in research, development, and specialised training throughout the semiconductor equipment value chain would strengthen the European Union’s bargaining power far more effectively at the global geopolitical level.<\/p>\n

The temptation to replicate the American or Asian model by subsidising large fabs\u2014semiconductor fabrication plants\u2014risks becoming little more than a waste of public resources. A niche strategy, built upon Europe’s existing strengths, would be both economically more rational and geopolitically more effective.<\/p>\n

Global competition in semiconductors will not necessarily be won by producing more chips, but by controlling the critical nodes of the value chain. Thanks to its leadership in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, Europe already occupies one of those strategic positions. A coherent industrial policy should begin from this reality, rather than pursuing the illusion that manufacturing self-sufficiency is the only path to technological sovereignty.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Daniel Gros is Professor of Practice and Director of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University. He previously served for twenty years as Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and contributed to the drafting of the Delors Report.<\/em><\/p>\n

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