{"id":2144,"date":"2024-05-16T19:52:34","date_gmt":"2024-05-16T17:52:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=2144"},"modified":"2024-05-27T17:59:30","modified_gmt":"2024-05-27T15:59:30","slug":"why-the-eu-cannot-yet-have-a-common-defence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/05\/16\/why-the-eu-cannot-yet-have-a-common-defence\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the EU cannot (yet) have a common defence"},"content":{"rendered":"

Several obstacles stand in the way of a <\/span><\/i>fully-fledged<\/span><\/i> common European defence policy. The main one is that the EU is not yet a federal state, but a union of states. For now, therefore, the focus is on the single market and on creating a common defence industry, based on voluntary cooperation between countries.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

In these times of renewed geopolitical tension, the discussion of whether the European Union should have a common defence has reignited.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The idea may seem particularly timely given that the United States\u2019 political, rather than economic, investment in NATO, which is the <\/span>de facto<\/span><\/i> defence bastion of the European Union, could be drastically reduced if Donald Trump were to be re-elected as US president. A common European defence would thus serve to ensure greater defence autonomy for the European Union and its member states. Yet, there is a lack of clarity on what is exactly meant by \u201cgreater common defence.\u201d If it means the ability to make coordinated decisions, to increase their effectiveness based on the principle that Unity is strength, then given the political will, much can be done within the existing Treaties.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But if by a common defence we mean a purely \u201cEuropean\u201d defence, one that transcends national interests and is provided with operational capabilities independent of member states (the much-flaunted European army), then the time has not yet come. Indeed, a true European defence is neither possible nor desirable without a radical transformation of the European Union from a union of states to a federal state. Such a transformation at the moment is implausible, and politically impossible.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The common security and defence policy and the \u201cstrategic compass\u201d<\/b><\/h3>\n

The Treaty on European Union provides for a common security and defense policy, as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. These \u201cpolicies\u201d are characterised by a lower level of integration compared to more traditional ones, such as the single market, and in fact are more akin to \u201creinforced\u201d international cooperation. Since the member states do not want to surrender their sovereignty in this field, most decisions are taken unanimously, and the role of the Commission and the European Parliament, the two institutions that are supposed to represent European interests rather than national ones, is much more limited.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Operational action in the field of common defence has been focused so far on missions aimed at ensuring peace, border security, navigation safety and so on. From an operational (and practical) point of view, these missions are composed of national soldiers, and a \u201cEuropean\u201d command, which reports to a committee of ambassadors from member states.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The most serious problem with these missions, as with other international missions, is the lack of clear accountability, both political and legal. Consider the European missions in the Mediterranean, which were implemented as common defence missions and not as immigration-related missions. If implemented in the context of common defence (as opposed to the context of immigration), they are not subject to the political scrutiny of either the European Parliament or national parliaments; they are also not subject to the judicial oversight of either the EU Court of Justice or national courts. Thus, if a European mission operates in breach of the rules of international or European law, there will hardly be any<\/span> legal consequences<\/span>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The common defence policy did not play a prominent role in the discussion on Europe\u2019s future until Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, when the debate over the need to increase its capability was revived.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In March 2022, less than a month after the invasion, the Council of the European Union adopted a \u201cstrategic compass\u201d to strengthen security and defence. Among the various actions planned is the creation of a rapid deployment capability of up to 5,000 military personnel (EU and national), which would enable the Union to react more immediately to crises.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The plan then also identifies one of the weaknesses of the EU\u2019s defence policy: unanimity.<\/span><\/p>\n

The unanimity rule<\/b><\/h3>\n

As we have seen on many occasions, having to make decisions unanimously can easily paralyse the European Union. Of course, unanimity preserves the sovereignty of states, since no one can be forced to do something they do not want to. But it does, in practice, allow for dynamics that are not always \u201cclassy\u201d \u2013 aimed not at asserting sovereignty, but at achieving other ends.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this regard, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n has proven to be a master: one need only recall the most lucrative bathroom break in history. In December 2023, the European Council was to decide whether to officially support the enlargement process for the Western Balkans, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. The pro-Russian Hungarian Prime minister had always been against Ukraine\u2019s entry into the Union; at the same time, however, he wanted the Recovery Fund monies, most of which had not yet been paid to Hungary due to the rule of law issues in that country. To avoid vetoing Kiev\u2019s entry, Orb\u00e1n thus agreed to leave the room for a bathroom break at the time of the deliberation, which was adopted unanimously with one absentee from the room. By pure coincidence, on the same day, the release of Recovery Fund money for Budapest was approved: more than 10 billion euros, of which 6 billion are grants that do not have to be repaid.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The unanimity rule undoubtedly constitutes an obstacle to the pursuit of effective common defence action: the European Union consists of 27 member states with very different political cultures and governments, and there is often no agreement on defence and foreign policy (consider the varied reaction of member states to the war in the Gaza Strip). Moreover, there is often talk of overriding the unanimity rule in other fields, but this would not be acceptable today in the context of common defence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Deploying troops is one of the most serious decisions that can be made by a government: that is why it is crucial that the decision be vetted not only by the national parliament, but also by public opinion. And it is vital that a government\u2019s choice can be punished or rewarded in the polls.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Overriding the unanimity rule in the field of common defence would then have serious repercussions for the democratic fabric of member countries, as at the European level those guarantees and democratic participation that characterise many nation-states are lacking. Basically, unanimity in such a sensitive area cannot and should not be set aside until there are constitutional guarantees and institutional reforms at the European level to ensure full transparency, and full political accountability, of decisions taken.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Member states, and European institutions, are well aware of these limitations, and always have been. The Treaty itself tries to balance the principle of state consensus with the need for effective actions by providing for the possibility for a group of willing states to engage in a mission. But these missions, unlike parallel forms of cooperation among member states, must still be unanimously authorised by the Council, although the \u201cstrategic compass\u201d calls for more flexible procedures and the use of constructive abstention to allow for more effective actions.<\/span><\/p>\n

The other obstacle: the European budget<\/b><\/h3>\n

Unanimity is not the only obstacle to a true common defence policy: as always, there is also an economic factor. The EU budget is relatively small, and the defence budget is even smaller: 2.12 billion euros in 2023, compared with total defence spending by the 27 member states of 240 billion. Added to this figure is the European Peace Facility (off-budget) of 17 billion, of which 5 billion is earmarked for Ukraine.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The recently adopted regulation on joint procurement in relation to defence products has a total budget of 300 million euros, since a minimum of 80% of the expenditure will have to be borne by the states participating in the procurement process. Moreover, the regulation was adopted not within the framework of the common defence policy, but on a legal basis aimed at ensuring the competitiveness of the Union\u2019s industries, without requiring unanimity and with the full participation of the European Parliament as co-legislator.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is now clear that in order to have an effective common defence, an adequate budget is required: in this respect, the pandemic has brought to light two important factors. First, the Union can legally and practically issue debt to finance the achievement of European objectives. But at the same time, the debate on the Recovery Fund has brought to light the resistance of some states to resort to this type of financing, i.e., purely European funds that are not derived from state contributions. The reason for the scepticism is that recourse to common debt is seen as more advantageous for those states, such as Italy, that have very high public debt.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, for the time being, the European Union has a very limited taxation capacity: only about 30% of the European budget comes from EU resources (customs duties, part of VAT and others). About 70% comes instead from state contributions. Increasing the budget to finance common defence necessarily implies either the issuance of debt or expenses for member states (either calculated as a waiver of tax revenues, accepting that the EU can impose some taxes; or through increased national contributions).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Issuing common debt is also the solution advocated by the report on the EU single market entitled \u201cMuch more than a market,\u201d prepared by Enrico Letta for the European Council and presented in April (see interview in this issue). As far as common debt or common taxes are concerned, it is also necessary to ensure that there are adequate guarantees of democratic oversight, from both the Parliament and the European public opinion, which would require radical reforms in European governance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Pursuing common defence through the single market<\/b><\/h3>\n

It was mentioned earlier that common and foreign defence policy functions differently from the more integrated single market policy. And it is precisely the single market that is being considered in order to articulate a more concrete defence policy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The European Commission has launched the first industrial strategy for common defence: as also noted in the article by Guntram B. Wolff in this issue, the goal is\u00a0 to jointly coordinate 40% of military equipment purchases; spend at least half of the defence procurement budget on products manufactured in the Union; and trade at least 35% of defence products within the European Union. Similarly, the April Letta Report identified defence market fragmentation as one of the EU\u2019s structural problems. The document suggests actions aimed at establishing harmonisation of regulations for defence-related activities, strategic planning and cooperation between industries. However, it also realistically identifies obstacles to a common defence market, some of which echo those already analysed in relation to the common defence policy: lack of trust among member states, especially when it comes to the fact the other states would make their military equipment available in case of need (mindful perhaps of the first weeks of the pandemic emergency, when some states blocked the export of personnel protection equipment that was crucial to dealing with Covid); and the differences in national defence policies.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Promoting defence industry integration, including through European-level funding, would then have a twofold advantage: that of encouraging the creation of a defence industrial and technological basis, thus repatriating those funds that are currently spent outside the EU (78%), and at the same time increasing the EU\u2019s defence autonomy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The momentum toward greater common European defence is for now limited to forms of close voluntary cooperation among member states, coordinated at the European level; and to using the single market, the area where European integration has been most successful, to create a European defence industry, with both the economic and strategic benefits that come with it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It remains to be seen whether this will be politically feasible, especially in light of the results of the European Parliament elections.<\/span><\/p>\n

Eleanor Spaventa<\/strong> is a full professor of European law at Bocconi University, a visiting professor at the College d\u2019Europe in Bruges and a visiting fellow at the European University Institute.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Several obstacles stand in the way of a fully-fledged common European defence policy. 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