{"id":2162,"date":"2024-05-16T20:52:06","date_gmt":"2024-05-16T18:52:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=2162"},"modified":"2024-05-27T18:02:12","modified_gmt":"2024-05-27T16:02:12","slug":"fearing-the-tech-apocalypse-europe-invests-in-old-chips","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/05\/16\/fearing-the-tech-apocalypse-europe-invests-in-old-chips\/","title":{"rendered":"Fearing the tech apocalypse, Europe invests in old chips"},"content":{"rendered":"

Reducing dependency on other countries for semiconductor supply: that is the goal the European Union intends to achieve with the Chips Act. Substantial resources, however, will be diverted to a plan that ends up investing in \u201cold\u201d chips and not in cutting-edge technologies<\/span><\/i>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The morning sun filters through the curtains. You wake up slowly and turn to grab your phone, <\/span>only to be met with a blank screen<\/span>. Venturing into the kitchen, you find that the coffee maker refuses to brew coffee and the toaster remains stubbornly cold. Outside, the streets are ominously quiet, devoid of the usual hustle and bustle of daily life. Public transport grinds to a halt, leaving commuters stranded and businesses paralyzed; supermarket shelves remain empty; hospitals struggle to keep crucial equipment running. Communication networks falter into silence.<\/span><\/p>\n

This apocalyptic scenario is a fairly accurate description of what would happen in our daily lives if semiconductor devices — or \u201cchips\u201d — were to suddenly disappear. Even seemingly mundane household appliances, such as washing machines and thermostats, rely on semiconductor technology. Chips are embedded in the fabric of everyday life, as indispensable components in a myriad of objects we use.<\/span><\/p>\n

Chips: How they work and who makes them<\/b><\/h3>\n

Microchips operate by using small electronic components to store and process information, with each component representing a 0 or a 1, allowing computers and electronic devices to perform various tasks based on binary values. The first modern microchip was invented in the United States in the late 1950s, and the first mass-produced product incorporated 16 elements (transistors). Today, the best chips have billions of these mounted on a piece of silicon the size of a fingernail.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

To achieve this performance, chip manufacturing has become increasingly complicated with different countries specializing in specific segments of the production process. As a result, today no single country dominates the entire value chain. The overall model consists of the United States, which has specialized in design (software), Asia (South Korea and Taiwan), which has the most advanced chip manufacturing factories, and Europe, which produces the best chip-making machines.<\/span>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

What\u2019s the problem?<\/b><\/h3>\n

Specialization implies that the United States and Europe import most of the chips they need.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Rough estimates, depending on the specific type of chip considered, indicate that only about 10-20% of the chips used in the EU are produced domestically. Dependence on external sources is seen as a vulnerability, as it exposes them to the uncertainty of possible supply chain disruptions and geopolitical tensions – a condition that could become particularly concerning because the European Union imports 70%of its chips from just five countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

Not all chips are the same<\/b><\/h3>\n

Chips differ substantially in both type and quality. There are two main categories: logic and memory chips. Logic semiconductors process digital information, while memory semiconductors are used to store data, such as photos and videos on the smartphone.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 1 shows that the European Union\u2019s dependence on foreign manufacturers, as well as the specific countries it relies on, varies significantly depending on the chips considered. The geopolitical risk associated with trade with Taiwan, for example, is more than halved when considering logic semiconductors instead of memory ones. In fact, the European Union sources similar amounts of logic chips from four countries (Taiwan, Malaysia, China, and Israel). Therefore, if one of these trading partners could no longer be relied on, it would be relatively easy to meet demand by increasing purchases from the other countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

European Union semiconductor imports<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"
Note: the figure presents European Union imports of logic and memory semiconductors in 2022 from each country as a percentage of total semiconductor imports. Source: Comtrade.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Is the European \u201cChips Act\u201d a good idea?<\/b><\/h3>\n

Motivated by these concerns, the European Union has undertaken an initiative to increase domestic chip production through a support plan called the European Chips Act. The package consists of rules and incentives that, according to the European Commission, will mobilize 43 billion euros in public and private investments. The declared objective is to \u201caddress semiconductor shortages and strengthen Europe\u2019s strategic leadership,\u201d and double the EU\u2019s global market share in semiconductor production, reaching 20% by 2030.<\/span><\/p>\n

Is the European Chips Act a good idea? In our opinion, three arguments call into question its rationality, efficiency, and strategic scope.<\/span><\/p>\n

How real is the geopolitical risk?<\/b><\/h3>\n

Let\u2019s start with the first argument. The Chips Act is justified on the basis of a geopolitical risk that could lead to a disruption of supply chains. But is this a likely risk?<\/span><\/p>\n

The dangers of doing business with partners who are not necessarily EU allies – such as China – or at risk of conflict – such as Taiwan – depend on how likely a crisis is in those countries. This is difficult to predict.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, subsidies provided by the EU are real and do not necessarily reflect actual risk. Doubling chip production at current prices by 2030 would require more than 40 billion euros. Would insurance against the actual risk of trade disruption with one or even several countries be worth this expense?<\/span><\/p>\n

The European Union is not as vulnerable as it seems. Suppose China turned its back on the EU and refused to supply the semiconductors it needs. Could Europe handle such a scenario? A more in-depth analysis of international trade data reveals that while the EU is a net importer of chips, it is a major net exporter of the machinery and equipment needed to produce them (Figure 2). This strengthens Europe\u2019s negotiating position on the global stage and significantly limits the risk of retaliation.<\/span><\/p>\n

European Union trade balance as to semiconductor manufacturing machinery (in billions)<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"
Note: the figure presents the difference between export and import of European Union semiconductor manufacturing machinery. Source: Comtrade.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The benefits of a globalized economy and the dangers of autarky<\/b><\/h3>\n

Secondly, subsidizing domestic semiconductor production in the European Union may prove to be completely inefficient. After all, there is a reason chip production is so concentrated in a few places: companies accumulate \u201cknow-how\u201d and skills and become extremely good at producing them. In this way, those who need semiconductors to produce goods – anything that includes an electronic component – benefit from lower production costs and, in turn, can offer lower prices to their customers.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, the average unit price of memory chips imported from Taiwan is US$0.63; while those imported from other countries are US$1.53. This means that Taiwanese manufacturers are able to produce chips at a much lower cost than their worldwide competitors, i.e., they are much more efficient.<\/span><\/p>\n

The average unit price of the European Union\u2019s chip exports is about US$1.4. To catch up with the Taiwanese, current and future European chip manufacturers will need a long time.<\/span><\/p>\n

From \u201cfabless\u201d to \u201cfoundry\u201d<\/b><\/h3>\n

Lastly, the key element of Asian dominance in semiconductor manufacturing is the \u201cfoundry\u201d model, introduced by TSMC, the leading Taiwanese company in this sector. This approach is characterized by exclusive specialization in the production phase, while the research, design, and marketing processes are the prerogative of external companies, the \u201cfabless\u201d companies. The design phase is the highest value-added phase and accounts for the highest share of value created in the semiconductor industry, according to the 2021 report by the American Semiconductor Industry Association. Today, the best example of a company specialized in the design phase is Nvidia, a fabless company with a market capitalization of over $2 trillion.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast, \u201cfoundries\u201d are capital-intensive companies \u2013 that is, where machinery and equipment are more relevant than the employment of personnel. Consequently, the \u201cfoundry\u201d model is based on access to low-cost capital, while the \u201cfabless\u201d model relies on the employment of highly skilled personnel (software engineers). There is no shortage of engineers in Europe, while the cost of capital is much higher than in Asian countries. It is therefore unclear whether subsidizing foundries in the European Union, as the Chips Act intends to do, is a good idea.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some argue that subsidizing domestic chip production could lead to an increase in employment in the European Union. However, it is unlikely to happen precisely because it is a capital-intensive industry. For example, Intel\u2019s new factory in Germany will cost about 30 billion euros (with over 10 billion euros in aid from the German government) and will create only 3,000 jobs: meaning an investment of 10 million euros for each job created.<\/span><\/p>\n

Successful foundries then require a wide range of intermediate products and services in the production of semiconductors: one example is chemicals, which are widely used in the manufacturing process. Chemical companies, therefore, tend to cluster geographically around chip manufacturing facilities. In the European Union, the creation of these \u201cclusters\u201d is not obvious because of its configuration into nation states.<\/span><\/p>\n

Who benefits from the Chips Act?<\/b><\/h3>\n

The Chips Act is designed to meet the growing demand for semiconductors from European Union manufacturers. However, a survey by the European Commission, conducted in 2022, suggests that over 70% of the demand is for old-generation chips of limited complexity. Why should we spend public resources to subsidize the production of old chips instead of investing in the latest generation and beyond?<\/span><\/p>\n

One reason could be the fact that a large part the of European demand for semiconductors comes from the automotive industry, which is a driving sector, as it alone accounts for 7%of the EU GDP and 6% of employment. The problem is that the automotive industry is based on mature technologies and has limited potential in stimulating economic growth.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, the Chips Act subsidizes foundries rather than incentivizing the fabless model, which involves advanced semiconductor design. <\/span>It is precisely this segment <\/span>of the industry that will give countries a strategic alternative to become leaders in the global geopolitical landscape. <\/span>This raises further doubts about<\/span> the \u201cstrategic\u201d value of the European initiative.<\/span><\/p>\n

Daniel Gros<\/strong> is the director of the Institute for European Policy at Bocconi University. He is currently a consultant to the European Parliament.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Massimo Morelli<\/strong> is a professor of political science and economics at Bocconi University. He has taught at several American universities<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Giorgio Presidente<\/strong> is a researcher at the Institute for European Policy at Bocconi University. He has held positions at the World Bank, the OECD, the European Central Bank and the UN.\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reducing dependency on other countries for semiconductor supply: that is the goal the European Union intends to achieve with the Chips Act. 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