{"id":3996,"date":"2024-09-02T11:16:35","date_gmt":"2024-09-02T09:16:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=3996"},"modified":"2024-09-02T11:16:35","modified_gmt":"2024-09-02T09:16:35","slug":"the-false-myths-of-the-superbonus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/09\/02\/the-false-myths-of-the-superbonus\/","title":{"rendered":"The false myths of the Superbonus"},"content":{"rendered":"

The various building bonuses have cost us 220 billion euros in four years. Have they at least managed to boost the Italian economy? No, those resources would have been better spent elsewhere. Moreover, it’s not even certain that they have resulted in increased energy efficiency of buildings, as all improvements are self-certified. This is a lesson to keep in mind for the future.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

The Super-Ecobonus 110% and other building bonuses are the main features of public finance in the 2020s. Overall, the spending from 2020 to the first quarter of 2024 is nearly 220 billion euros, a figure equivalent to eleven years of IMU revenue and higher than that projected until 2026 for the National Recovery and Resilience Plan.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Cost of Building Bonuses (in millions of euros)<\/b><\/h3>\n
\"\"
Source: Calculations based on ENEA and Revenue Agency data.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

All the Building Bonuses<\/b><\/h3>\n

Residential construction has been structurally subsidized for a quarter of a century with a generosity unmatched elsewhere. Building bonuses began in 1998 with the introduction of the home bonus, a ten-year Irpef deduction for renovations (with a spending rate of 41%, later increased to 50%). Among the main additions were the ecobonus (in 2013 with a 65% rate, also over ten years) and the earthquake bonus (in 2017 with rates from 50% to 80%). By 2019, the annual cost of deductions for renovation and energy requalification expenses was about 10 billion euros. The real increase occurred in 2019-2020. First, the facade bonus was introduced with a 90% deduction over ten years, and in May 2020, the Super-Ecobonus and Super-Earthquake bonuses were introduced with a 110% deduction over five (later four) years and the ability to transfer credit (extended to all building bonuses). Initially set to expire at the end of 2021, the two Superbonuses were extended to 2023 with a 110% rate and reduced rates (70% and 65%) for 2024 and 2025. The facade bonus was extended through 2022 (but with a reduced rate of 60%). The credit transfer option was first limited and then blocked at the beginning of 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

In assessing the impact, focusing on the three major bonuses, the issues to consider are primarily the effects on the economy and public finance of such substantial spending. Then, particularly for the Super-Ecobonus, one needs to consider the benefit in terms of energy savings.<\/span><\/p>\n

Did It Boost Italian GDP?<\/b><\/h3>\n

The spending had a very noticeable impact on the construction sector, which is hardly surprising. Just one data point as an example: in 2023, compared to 2019, gross fixed investments in the housing sub-sector grew by 86% in current prices and 64% in constant prices (compared to growth rates for the entire economy of 37% and 26%, respectively). Considering the construction sector as a whole, the effect of the bonuses is evident when comparing investment trends in the two sub-sectors: the growth rate for non-residential buildings is one-third that of residential buildings.<\/span><\/p>\n

Estimating the broader economic impacts is a complex exercise. We want to address two questions which are fundamentally interconnected. First, how much GDP growth can be attributed to the effect of the subsidies. Second, how much of the initial subsidy cost is effectively repaid by the tax revenue generated by new construction investments. The answers largely depend on the first question: how much of the investments benefiting from the subsidies are additional to the volume of investments that would have been made anyway. This issue always arises when evaluating the effect of a subsidy: you want to incentivize increased production of a particular good, but part of the spending benefits would have been produced anyway. This part of the spending is referred to in economic jargon as “deadweight loss.” Ignoring this results in a severe overestimation of the incentive effect of the subsidies.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, a recent study on the effects of building bonuses from the late 1990s to 2021 concluded that the spending was self-financing, based on the assumption that all investments benefiting from the various bonuses would not have been made otherwise. This is an evidently absurd assumption, as it implies that there would have been no apartment renovations for over twenty years without the bonuses.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the case of the bonuses in recent years, two factors make the estimate difficult: the generosity of the schemes and their temporary nature. For example, the facade bonus covered 90% of the spending and was effectively operational for only one year. It is plausible that a large portion of the investments merely anticipated works that private individuals would have financed in the future. If viewed over several years, the “deadweight loss” is likely very high. For the two versions of the Superbonus (eco and earthquake), the rate was even higher (110%) for over three years and certainly replaced investments financed with traditional bonuses (at 50% and 65%). Furthermore, the scheme created intense pressure on the sector’s production capacity, probably crowding out other investments, not only in residential construction but also in non-residential. Therefore, the issue is not resolved by simply asking how many people would have installed thermal insulation without the Superbonus; one must consider the entire sector.<\/span><\/p>\n

A simplified approach used here for illustrative purposes without analytical rigor is to observe the trend in residential and non-residential investments over the past twenty years. The graph shows that the two series are essentially overlapping with a slight downward trend from 2004 to 2020; then both grow, but the residential sector at a three times higher rate. A reasonable hypothesis is that without the various Superbonuses, residential investments would have followed the same trend as non-residential building investments.<\/span><\/p>\n

Gross Fixed Investments in Construction 2004-2023 (in millions of euros)<\/b><\/h3>\n
\"\"
Source: Istat National Accounts (March 2024).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

A Self-Financing Measure?<\/b><\/h3>\n

Let’s start with the hypothesis that additional investments are two-thirds of the total and assume a fiscal multiplier of 1 (meaning a permanent fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP translates into a GDP increase of the same amount). This value roughly aligns with the results of statistical forecasting models for economic trends and accounts for the negative effect of imports (about 17%, considering the entire chain of involved sectors). On this basis, it concludes that the combined effect of the three major bonuses (Super-Eco, Super-Earthquake, and Facades) would have been a cumulative impact of 27 GDP nominal points over the three years 2021-2023. In the same period, the cumulative nominal GDP growth was 255 points. Even assuming all investments are additional, the relative dimension doesn’t change: the cumulative GDP increase would be 41%. In short, the contribution of the three major bonuses to GDP growth in the three years 2021-2023 would be between 10% and 15% of the total. This is a significant result but far from the claim that the bonuses are responsible for much of the post-pandemic recovery.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another argument often made is that the “Superbonus pays for itself”: the additional tax revenue generated by the investments would cover the spending. This is not the case. Considering only the two Superbonuses and assuming again that the share of additional investment is two-thirds, the net cost to public finance is around 70% of the gross spending. If all investments are assumed to be additional, the net cost drops to 61% (see the table below for the calculation details).<\/span><\/p>\n

Calculation of the Net Cost of the Superbonus 110% for Public Finance<\/b><\/h3>\n
\"\"
Source: Calculations based on data from the table on page XXX.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Did It Pull Us Out of the Recession?<\/b><\/h3>\n

What legacy do the bonuses leave behind? Once the fiscal stimulus is exhausted, output returns to its initial level (along with the costs of reallocating human and financial resources in the sector), while the debt remains. There is always the possibility that investments have increased the economy’s growth potential. This does not seem to be the case. As noted by Istat in a study based on input-output tables, the construction sector shows lower-than-average labour productivity and greater fragmentation of production relationships. According to the study, the investment stimulus in construction would have caused a 0.6% reduction in labour productivity for the entire economy.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, a recession destroys production capacity, and a temporary fiscal stimulus, including bonuses, counteracts this effect by supporting activity levels. The stimulus can therefore have some permanent consequences. In the case of the Superbonus, it would have made sense with the deadline at the end of 2021, as initially planned when the scheme was introduced. Subsequent extensions approved with general rejoicing were unjustified.<\/span><\/p>\n

In summary, regarding the goal of increasing our economy’s growth potential, building bonuses are an ineffective tool: the vast resources spent in recent years could have been much better employed elsewhere.<\/span><\/p>\n

Did It Increase Energy Savings?<\/b><\/h3>\n

The main objective of the most important measure, the Super-Ecobonus, was to make residential properties more energy efficient. What is the legacy from this perspective? Before attempting to answer, a premise must be made. The Super-Ecobonus cost 123 billion and involved an estimated 4-5% of total dwellings. To reach 30% of the stock, spending would need to approach 750 billion; for 50% of the stock, over 1,200 billion would be needed. If this were the only tool available, we would simply have to conclude that we cannot afford to address the issue of energy efficiency in housing, and it would be better to move on to other matters.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fortunately, there are strong reasons to believe that the 110% bonus has a particularly low cost-effectiveness ratio. Firstly, due to its gratuity, despite the obvious private benefits in terms of property value appreciation and energy consumption savings. Other reasons include the breadth of eligible works in addition to the “leading” ones that generate most energy savings and the lack of selectivity in terms of savings potential. A study by the Parliamentary Budget Office conducted in 2023, based on microdata provided by ENEA for 2021-2022, shows that leading works absorbed about 50% of spending and that 70% of total energy savings (estimated by ENEA) were achieved by 21.5% of the involved dwellings at a cost of 28% of total spending. ENEA itself, in its 2023 Report, notes that unit costs (per sqm and kW) specific to individual types of Super-Ecobonus interventions are higher than the corresponding old ecobonus costs and in many cases exceed double.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, there is a fundamental problem with estimating energy savings: the reliability and significance of the data. Everything is based on self-declarations: Energy Performance Certificates (Ape) certified by individual professionals. Controls are entrusted to ENEA, and for the Superbonus, they consist of document checks for 5% of certificates and subsequent on-site inspections for less than 0.5%. Generally, this is due to the choice made by Italy when the Ape was introduced in 2009 to rely on individual professionals rather than independent technical agencies as in other European countries. This resulted in a system with serious problems of homogeneity in the drafting criteria and quality verification of collected information. Additionally, the significance of data to assess intervention effectiveness is questionable. Energy savings estimates based on Ape are engineering-type and tend to overestimate actual savings, which depend on user behaviour (costs less, consumes more). A retrospective evaluation of the results obtained, easy to carry out with a sample of bills showing actual kW consumption before and after the interventions, would be very important to evaluate the success of the Superbonus.<\/span><\/p>\n

With the unfortunate Superbonus season concluded, the European directive on building energy performance will need to be applied in the coming years (see box), containing provisions addressing many of the limitations of our recent experience (on subsidy design, independent evaluations, and monitoring). It is important to take it seriously.<\/span><\/p>\n

The European Directive: How to Respond Without Repeating Superbonus Mistakes?<\/b><\/h3>\n

The European directive on the energy performance of buildings, approved in April 2024, requires individual countries to prepare National Building Renovation Plans with a review of the national building stock (an area where we are far behind) and a roadmap for the coming decades (until 2050).<\/span><\/p>\n

Objectives are set for new buildings, which must be zero-emission from 2028 for public properties and from 2030 for all buildings. For existing stock, member states must ensure a 16% reduction in energy consumption by 2030 and 20-22% by 2033 compared to 2020 consumption. At least 55% of the reduction must be achieved through the renovation of residential buildings with the worst performance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Where to Concentrate Subsidies<\/b><\/h3>\n

These goals are incompatible with the Superbonus approach, which neglects public real estate and provides scattered subsidies to private individuals without any selectivity regarding energy-saving potential or economic conditions of beneficiaries. Instead, subsidies should be concentrated on the worst energy classes and the subsidy intensity modulated, prioritizing the less affluent. The issue of energy poverty is particularly critical given the abolition of credit transferability and therefore the discount on the invoice (which allowed the poorest to access the benefits). However, from a long-term perspective, the reasons for using tax deductions to spread the burden on the public budget over time disappear. Instead, for transparency and to reduce financial intermediation costs, direct subsidies (public spending) should be used, as done elsewhere. The subsidy could be integrated with schemes such as the directive’s pay-as-you-save (effectively transferring achieved energy savings to the electricity distributor) and “green” loans, even at zero interest rates.<\/span><\/p>\n

A fundamental aspect is the programme’s management. For the ecobonus and Superbonus, spontaneous interaction between homeowners and companies was relied upon. The directive envisions establishing one-stop shops, one for every 80,000 inhabitants (about 700 offices in Italy), offering free integrated energy renovation services and energy consultations. An independent control system is also envisaged to ensure the quality of energy performance certificates and inspect system characteristics. Something similar has existed in France since 2022 for implementing the France Renov subsidy programme: 550 offices (Espaces Conseil) responsible for certifying the actual impact of efficiency measures post-intervention.<\/span><\/p>\n

Bio<\/b><\/em><\/p>\n

Giuseppe Pisauro<\/strong> is a professor of public finance at the Sapienza, University of Rome. He served as the president of the Parliamentary Budget Office from 2014 to 2022.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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