{"id":5555,"date":"2024-12-10T12:13:02","date_gmt":"2024-12-10T11:13:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=5555"},"modified":"2024-12-10T12:13:02","modified_gmt":"2024-12-10T11:13:02","slug":"good-intentions-for-public-finances-but-few-numbers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/12\/10\/good-intentions-for-public-finances-but-few-numbers\/","title":{"rendered":"Good Intentions for Public Finances, But Few Numbers"},"content":{"rendered":"

The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact allows individual countries to develop their own plans to put public finances on a more sustainable path. This represents a significant change, as each country now commits to a multiyear adjustment path for public finances. Italy\u2019s structural budget plan contains numerous good intentions, yet offers few details on how they will be achieved.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

The European Union introduced a major change in 2024: the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. This new text adjusts the European constraints on the public finances of member states (see Box below). The main difference is that the so-called \u201cpreventive arm\u201d of the Pact now adopts a medium-term approach: any country that does not comply with Maastricht rules must submit a multi-year legislative plan\u2014called the \u201cMedium-Term Structural Budget Plan\u201d\u2014to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to a plausibly declining path by the end of the period. Upon request, the Plan can be extended to seven years (with a more moderate adjustment process), provided the country commits to a program of reforms and investments to support growth, which must be clearly defined in the Plan and whose implementation will be monitored by the European Commission.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Commitment from the Country, Not Imposed by the Commission<\/b><\/h3>\n

In the new system, each country formulates its own commitment to control the growth of net expenditure, an alternative indicator to the previously used structural primary balance (see Box 2). Importantly, the Plan is national: the Commission offers suggestions (in the form of \u201creference paths\u201d for net spending for each country), but a state may deviate from them if it justifies the change with economic arguments supported by empirical estimates.<\/span><\/p>\n

The core idea behind the new system is simple. Based on assumptions about potential GDP growth in the future\u2014meaning estimates of income growth under \u201cnormal\u201d utilization of productive factors\u2014and estimates of future inflation, a country that wants to reduce its debt must ensure that nominal spending grows less than potential nominal GDP. Naturally, if a country wants to spend more, it can always do so by increasing tax revenues through specific legislative measures (which is why the expenditure indicator is net of discretionary revenues). This system is designed to automatically produce countercyclical effects: if the economic cycle is positive (i.e., actual income grows more than potential income), revenues exceed expectations, but the country cannot spend them, as it is bound to maintain the initial spending growth target, thus cooling the economy. Conversely, if the cycle is negative (actual income grows less than potential income), revenues decline, yet the country maintains its planned spending path, thus supporting the economy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another advantage is that net expenditure largely corresponds to the sum of the spending items that parliamentarians vote on during budget sessions. There is thus greater transparency compared to the previous indicator, the \u201cstructural deficit,\u201d which was more complex and harder to understand (see Box 1).<\/span><\/p>\n

Under the new Stability and Growth Pact, the evolution of net expenditure becomes the sole indicator the Commission uses for surveillance. If a country significantly deviates from its multi-year commitment, the Commission opens an excessive deficit procedure (the country then enters the \u201ccorrective arm\u201d of the Pact \u2013 see Box 1) and requests a new Plan to correct the deviation. This procedure may be accompanied by sanctions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since this is a legislative plan, it binds only the government in office during that period. Indeed, if a new government takes office for any reason, it has the option of presenting a new Plan, which must still comply with the general criteria (net expenditure evolution) necessary for reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Difficult Start of the Reform<\/b><\/h3>\n

The old Stability and Growth Pact was suspended in March 2020 to allow countries to spend freely for anti-pandemic purposes. It was reactivated on January 1, 2024, when the reform should theoretically have already been in force. However, the negotiation process among states took longer than expected, and the new Pact was finalized only in late April 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

This delayed and accelerated the introduction of the new system. The Commission presented its reference paths in June 2024 (it should normally do so in January), and countries were required to submit their Plan by September 20, 2024 (normally they should do so in April). Italy submitted its seven-year Plan on September 27, slightly delayed, partly to wait for the national public accounts revision published by Istat on September 23.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another complicating factor arose. In June 2024, based on 2023 results, the Commission concluded that eight European countries, including Italy, France, and Belgium, had systematically violated the 3% deficit-to-GDP rule and therefore should be placed in the \u201ccorrective\u201d rather than the \u201cpreventive\u201d arm of the Pact. However, instead of issuing immediate quantitative instructions, as is customary in such cases, the Commission chose to wait and verify at the time of Plan submission whether the proposed path by the country under excessive deficit procedure complied with European rules, which remain unchanged on this point. Specifically, countries under procedure should implement a deficit correction of at least 0.5% of GDP each year, but under the reform agreement among member states, this requirement has been temporarily limited until 2027 to the primary deficit (the deficit excluding interest on debt).<\/span><\/p>\n

Italy\u2019s First Medium-Term Structural Budget Plan<\/b><\/h3>\n

Italy\u2019s Plan invites various observations. First, the government\u2019s chosen adjustment path is, in the early years, more aggressive than what the Commission required in June and even more aggressive than what the government could have requested by using the same methodology as the Commission, based on Istat\u2019s revision in September, which certified a higher GDP for 2023 and, consequently, a lower deficit and debt than previously estimated in June. Based on its estimates, the Commission had suggested a net expenditure growth of 1.6% in 2025 and 2026, followed by further reductions in subsequent years (with an average annual growth of 1.5% for 2025\u20132031). The government committed to limiting net expenditure growth to 1.3% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, with a more gradual path in the following years. By the end of the period, the figures align with the Commission\u2019s requests. The government\u2019s commitment is to bring the deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3% by 2026, thereby exiting the infringement procedure, while the Commission envisaged a more gradual path, reducing the ratio below 3% only by 2029.<\/span><\/p>\n

This acceleration is good news because a faster adjustment process, if the government manages to achieve it, will improve the country\u2019s reputation and likely lead to lower spreads and interest payments on the debt. Additionally, due to the legacy of the Superbonus, the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to rise in the coming years; thus, it was essential to send a signal of increased adjustment effort to both financial markets and European partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

Why the Approach Matters<\/b><\/h3>\n

The second observation is that in drafting the Plan, the government departed from the Commission\u2019s methodology, using its traditional programming tools. This is significant because, during the debate on the Pact revision, there were concerns that the Commission\u2019s proposed paths might become overly binding for countries, thereby undermining the \u201cnational\u201d character of the Plan. Moreover, the Commission\u2019s methodology (based on so-called debt-sustainability analysis) is technically sound but relies on common assumptions for all European countries, which may be inaccurate in some cases. The fact that the government was able to propose different assumptions on certain key variables, and that these were accepted by the Commission (as it seems from the technical dialogue already underway), is thus a positive and clarifying element in the debate.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the good news stops there. The Plan is filled with good intentions, particularly in terms of future policy commitments, but it is oddly devoid of estimates and quantitative data that would allow a full assessment. For instance, the Plan states that the government intends to increase healthcare spending beyond net expenditure, finance public sector contract revisions, support maternity, and sustain investments even after 2026, i.e., after the National Recovery and Resilience Plan concludes. Yet none of these commitments are quantified in the Plan, nor is it clear where the resources to fulfill them will be found. For example, it remains unclear what will be done with pension spending, which alone accounts for more than a third of primary spending and is expected to grow faster than the proposed net expenditure growth. If one of the Plan\u2019s objectives was to enable a more rational discussion of Italy\u2019s public finance situation and potential future measures, it seems to have missed the mark.<\/span><\/p>\n

This also affects the budget maneuver for the coming year and those to follow. The Plan sets targets but does not specify how to reach them, so it remains unclear (this will only be clarified when the budget law is presented) where the government will find the approximately \u20ac12 billion needed simply to continue expiring policies in 2024 into 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

For now, we can only say that from a macroeconomic perspective, the Plan\u2019s medium-term sustainability relies on the assumption that the revenue increase certified by Istat in September is structural and will persist in 2025 and beyond. We hope this will be the case.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Box 1: From 1997 to Today: How the Stability and Growth Pact Has Evolved<\/b><\/p>\n

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established fiscal criteria for admitting individual countries into the monetary union. In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced, setting rules for the public finances of member countries, following the Maastricht criteria: a budget deficit under 3% of GDP and a target to gradually converge towards a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2005, the SGP was revised, and a “preventive arm” was introduced for countries that meet the 3% deficit threshold. In this arm, the Commission issues recommendations to countries based on their structural deficit (i.e., adjusted for economic cycle variations in revenues and expenditures), which they must gradually align with a medium-term objective (MTO), essentially budget balance. Later, the debt convergence principle was further refined by adding the \u201c1\/20 rule\u201d to the preventive arm, requiring countries with a debt above 60% to reduce the gap between their debt-to-GDP ratio and the 60% target by one-twentieth each year. The “corrective arm” of the Pact remained unchanged, encompassing procedures that come into effect if the Commission finds a country has permanently exceeded the 3% deficit threshold. Between 2011 and 2013, after the financial crisis, the SGP was tightened, introducing the possibility of sanctions even within the preventive arm.<\/span><\/p>\n

In April 2024, in light of the SGP\u2019s difficulties in meeting its goals and the new macroeconomic context, an agreement was reached on its reform. Key changes include the removal of the \u201c1\/20 rule,\u201d as well as the replacement of the structural deficit and MTO in the preventive arm with a medium-term structural budget plan.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Box 2: What Is \u201cNet Expenditure\u201d?<\/b><\/p>\n

Net expenditure is the total public administration expenditure after subtracting certain items: interest on public debt, discretionary revenues (i.e., structural revenue changes due to government actions), certain spending categories tied to the economic cycle (like unemployment benefits), and expenses funded at the European level (including national co-financing of European programs).<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact allows individual countries to develop their own plans to put public finances on a more sustainable path. 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