{"id":6514,"date":"2025-01-31T08:11:42","date_gmt":"2025-01-31T07:11:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=6514"},"modified":"2025-01-31T08:11:42","modified_gmt":"2025-01-31T07:11:42","slug":"the-costs-of-fragmented-military-spending","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2025\/01\/31\/the-costs-of-fragmented-military-spending\/","title":{"rendered":"The Costs of Fragmented Military Spending"},"content":{"rendered":"

International tensions are pushing EU countries toward increased defense spending, especially for those that are also NATO members. But how much does Europe spend? What are the trends in the production and trade of military equipment? A comparison with the U.S. highlights the consequences of fragmentation, particularly when states prioritize their national champions. <\/em>However, the Draghi Report offers some solutions.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, defense spending in the European Union decreased significantly, dropping from 2.6% of GDP in 1989 to 1.8% in 1998. A turning point occurred at the NATO Wales Summit in late 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, when NATO reinforced the commitment for all member states to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defense spending within a decade, with at least 20% of this dedicated to new equipment.<\/p>\n

Between 2015 and 2023, defense spending rose by 50% in real terms, with a further substantial increase expected this year. However, the defense spending-to-GDP ratio remains below late 1980s levels: NATO projects it will reach 1.9% in 2024. The number of EU NATO members meeting the 2% target is also rising, from eight in 2023 to fifteen in 2024. Italy remains below the threshold, with projected spending of 1.5% of GDP. In comparison, the United States is forecasted to allocate 3.4% of its GDP to defense in 2024.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP in EU-27 Countries<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Note: The figure shows the ratio of total defense spending by EU-27 countries to their GDP. The 2024 data are NATO projections. Source: NATO, SIPRI.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

 <\/p>\n

Composition of Defense Spending<\/strong><\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

Composition of Defense Spending (in Percentage)<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Note: The dashed line represents the United States, which can be marked directly on the line. Source: NATO.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

 <\/p>\n

Defense spending can be divided into three main components: (i) armaments and infrastructure, (ii) personnel, and (iii) operations (including training) and maintenance. A well-balanced distribution among these components is essential for functional armed forces.<\/p>\n

In EU countries, the share allocated to armaments and infrastructure is lower than the 30% reached by the United States (see figure above). While this gap is narrowing (46.2% of the increase in European defense spending since 2015 has gone to equipment and infrastructure), spending in this area still lags behind the U.S.<\/p>\n

Similarly, Europe allocates relatively little to \u201coperations and maintenance,\u201d which include the costs of using weapons and training. In EU countries, this category accounts for 27% of total defense spending compared to 43% in the United States.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, a significant portion of European defense spending goes to military personnel. This share, influenced by the number of military personnel and their salaries, varies widely among countries, ranging from 20% in Sweden to 60% in Italy and Portugal. Only five EU countries spend less than the 27% allocated by the U.S. The high personnel costs in some European countries likely reflect clientelistic factors and are notably higher in nations with higher public debt-to-GDP ratios.<\/p>\n

Overall, while Europe invests heavily in its soldiers, it spends relatively little on equipping and training them. On average, spending on equipment, infrastructure, and operations per military unit in the EU is more than three times lower than in the United States. Even when accounting for differences in per capita income, U.S. spending remains double that of Europe.<\/p>\n

It appears that military spending has partially served social needs, increasing public employment (both in terms of personnel numbers and remuneration) rather than addressing genuine defense needs. In a world dominated by technology, having many soldiers with limited equipment and training is far from ideal.<\/p>\n

European Arms Production, Imports, and Exports<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

EU Arms Imports by Origin<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Note: Data are expressed in billions of trend-indicator values (TIV). The TIV is a price index reflecting military capability rather than financial value. It is based on known unit production costs for a base set of weapons. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

 <\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s defense industry has grown rapidly in recent years. Employment in the sector increased by over a third between 2014 and 2022, reaching 516,000 employees (0.03% of European employment) and generating total revenues of 135 billion euros, according to the Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe (ASD).<\/p>\n

However, European companies remain small compared to their U.S. counterparts. In 2021, the largest European firm, Leonardo, reported revenues of $15 billion, while the largest U.S. firm, Lockheed Martin, reported $65.9 billion (four and a half times larger).<\/p>\n

European firms are also less effective exporters. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, U.S. arms exports totaled $38 billion between 2021 and 2023, compared to $26 billion for European countries. Although the EU is a net arms exporter, it imports significantly from the U.S., accounting for two-thirds of total imports in 2023. In contrast, U.S. arms imports were five times smaller, with 47% sourced from Europe.<\/p>\n

The small size of European firms, which limits their research capacity and economies of scale, is not solely due to lower overall spending on armaments (U.S. defense spending was $252 billion in 2023 compared to $71 billion in the EU). Fragmented procurement also plays a role. Military supply purchases are primarily conducted at the national level, unnecessarily increasing costs or reducing available armaments for the same expenditure. Direct EU defense spending accounts for just 2% of the already small EU budget (1% of EU GDP). Multilateral initiatives, particularly in aerospace, offer significant economies of scale but often involve only groups of countries rather than the entire Union. For instance, in January 2024, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain ordered 1,000 Patriot anti-aircraft missiles at discounted prices (The Economist, January 14, 2024). Such collaborations, however, remain exceptions.<\/p>\n

Overall, Europe\u2019s defense market exhibits characteristics of a constrained and protectionist environment that favors national champions, reducing competition and efficiency.<\/p>\n

Limited European Initiatives<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Several initiatives have been launched in recent years to reduce defense spending fragmentation in the EU. Key among these is the European External Action Service, which serves as the Union\u2019s defense and foreign affairs secretariat. The European Defense Agency (EDA) and the Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space are also responsible for various initiatives to enhance coordination and reduce fragmentation, such as the \u201cStrategic Compass,\u201d the EU\u2019s Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), and the European Defence Fund (EDF).<\/p>\n

Recent EDIS goals include achieving intra-EU trade in defense equivalent to 35% of the market value, with 50% of procurement produced domestically by 2030 (rising to 60% by 2035) and 40% of investments jointly purchased by member states.<\/p>\n

To promote research and development, 26 EU countries established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an incubator for cooperative defense projects. The European Defense Agency has set a non-binding goal of achieving at least 35% collaborative procurement projects by 2030 (from less than 20% in 2021).<\/p>\n

The European Commission is also working to establish a European Defence Equipment Market to foster competition, but strategic exemptions often favor national champions. In sum, initiatives are often non-binding, involve only some countries, and lack adequate resources. As Keith Hartley of the University of York noted, they amount to \u201cmany fine words (…) with little operational relevance.\u201d<\/p>\n

Proposals from the Draghi Report<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Achieving truly coordinated European defense requires addressing numerous issues, particularly the predominance of national interests. The fragmented approach to procurement and development reflects a desire to protect national champions, driven by both strategic concerns and the aim of stimulating domestic economies.<\/p>\n

Europe remains a collection of states with limited mutual trust. However, as the need for effective and efficient defense grows, cooperative initiatives may gain traction.<\/p>\n

The Draghi Report on European competitiveness called for more coordinated action, including increasing joint procurement of armaments and further developing industrial strategies prioritizing cooperation and integration. Proposed measures include introducing preferential principles for intra-EU supply chains and, in the long term, concentrating efforts on research and development.<\/p>\n

The report also addresses the need for additional funding for defense spending. Two proposed actions are: raising funds through joint debt issuance for European industrial plans and removing restrictions on defense investment by EU-issued instruments and the European Investment Bank.<\/p>\n

Funding defense through public debt, whether jointly issued at the European level or by individual states, entails trade-offs. Producing more arms requires allocating real European resources\u2014labor and materials\u2014to defense rather than other areas (unless higher spending exclusively increases imports). Military spending is primarily current expenditure, diminishing the rationale for debt financing. The argument for debt financing investments, which boosts potential income, applies only to research and development components of military spending, not to most equipment and infrastructure.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Carlo Cottarelli is a former Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department and Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund. He is currently the Director of the Italian Public Accounts Observatory at the Catholic University of Milan, where he teaches Fiscal Macroeconomics.<\/em><\/p>\n

Leoluca Virgadamo is a research assistant in the Finance Department at IESE Business School in Barcelona. Previously, he was a Junior Economist at the Italian Public Accounts Observatory at the Catholic University of Milan.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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