{"id":6949,"date":"2025-02-10T16:00:27","date_gmt":"2025-02-10T15:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=6949"},"modified":"2025-02-10T16:00:27","modified_gmt":"2025-02-10T15:00:27","slug":"the-agreement-with-albania-and-other-deals-that-dont-work","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2025\/02\/10\/the-agreement-with-albania-and-other-deals-that-dont-work\/","title":{"rendered":"The Agreement with Albania and Other Deals That Don\u2019t Work"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Prime Minister vigorously defends the agreement with Albania regarding asylum seeker centers. Meanwhile, Europe has already entered into agreements with countries of varying reliability to delegate control of migrant flows to them. These agreements undermine refugee rights and provide limited benefits to Europeans: they mostly redirect migration routes, come at a high financial cost, and expose Europe to the risk of blackmail.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

On November 6, 2023, Rome and Tirana signed a protocol to strengthen collaboration on migration management. The agreement entails building centers in Albania where Italian authorities will transport asylum seekers intercepted in international waters to process their applications and, if approved, eventually transfer them to Italy.<\/p>\n

\u201cInnovative\u201d Solutions for International Migration<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The agreement has garnered significant media attention and broad international approval. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described it as an innovative example of collaboration with third countries in managing migration flows. UK Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer also praised it, though it closely resembles efforts by several of his Conservative predecessors to establish a similar system in Rwanda. After a protracted journey through British and European courts, the plan was ultimately abandoned by the Labour government without a single asylum seeker ever being transferred to the African country. According to the National Audit Office, this initiative incurred costs totaling at least \u00a3318 million.<\/p>\n

The implementation of the Italy-Albania agreement has also faced legal hurdles, and so far, no migrants have been detained in the center. Assuming the protocol becomes operational in the coming months, we can already offer some speculative evaluations of its utility and effectiveness. Italy’s Prime Minister seems certain: \u201cWe are not spending additional resources but making an investment.\u201d Giorgia Meloni explained that the protocol involves expenses amounting to \u20ac670 million over five years, \u20ac134 million annually, which, she added, \u201crepresent 7.5% of the costs associated with migrant reception in our national territory (…). The most useful aspect of this project is that it could serve as an extraordinary deterrent to those seeking to reach Europe irregularly and combat traffickers. This would lead to cost containment.\u201d<\/p>\n

The two key elements, therefore, are cost savings and deterrence, i.e., the reduction of irregular arrivals.<\/p>\n

Cost Savings and Deterrence<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Where do the cost savings come from? It\u2019s difficult to understand. Migrants transferred to Albania would still incur management costs if held in Italy. Therefore, the additional expenses of outsourcing to Tirana must be considered relative to the potential savings from using Albanian personnel and services. The technical report accompanying the protocol outlines costs of approximately \u20ac670 million over the first five years. According to data reanalyzed by the Openpolis Foundation (figure below), \u20ac30 million will be spent on building the facilities in Albania, and another \u20ac30 million on their management. However, the largest expense category is travel costs for Ministry officials: \u20ac252 million, nearly 40% of the total budget, amounting to \u20ac140,000 per day over five years. Other costs include \u20ac95 million for ship charters and \u20ac94 million for external surveillance reimbursements. All of these expenses could presumably be avoided by using facilities and personnel within Italy.<\/p>\n

Cost savings could materialize if the protocol proves to be an \u201cextraordinary deterrent,\u201d as argued by Giorgia Meloni. Reducing irregular migration flows could generate significant savings in managing migrants, turning the \u20ac670 million into an \u201cinvestment.\u201d But how would deterrence be achieved? The agreement with Albania is intended to send a strong signal to potential migrants that the dream of entering Italy has become even harder to realize. However, asylum seekers transferred to Albania who obtain refugee status would still be relocated to Italy as legal residents. Furthermore, the chances of applying for or being granted asylum should not differ between a migrant transferred to Albania and one who remains in Italy. With a maximum capacity of 1,000 places, will the risk of being detained in an Albanian center deter people willing to risk their lives on precarious boats crossing the Mediterranean? This seems unlikely.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Costs of the Italy-Albania Agreement (in Millions of Euros)<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Source: Openpolis.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

 <\/p>\n

Outsourcing Borders: How Is Deterrence Achieved?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

How, then, is deterrence achieved? Here, it\u2019s essential to clarify terms and objectives.<\/p>\n

If deterrence aims to discourage dangerous journeys while protecting the welfare and asylum rights of those fleeing violence, the political solutions are clear. As the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) emphasizes, offices should be opened in conflict zones and neighboring countries where asylum applications can be submitted\u2014eliminating the need for physical travel to Europe\u2014and ensuring a possibility of being accepted and transferred legally and safely to a European country, following the examples of the United States, Canada, and, partially, Scandinavian countries. The risk with this solution is an increase in asylum applications.<\/p>\n

If, however, deterrence aims to reduce arrivals and asylum applications in Europe\u2014seemingly the goal shared by many European leaders and linked to the \u201ccost savings\u201d cited by Giorgia Meloni\u2014the approach is entirely different. While no politician openly admits it, abandoning migrant rights protections appears to be the only way to drastically reduce migration flows. This rationale underpins the practice of outsourcing border control to third countries, which began well before the Italy-Albania agreement and came to prominence during the 2015-2016 \u201crefugee crisis,\u201d when over 1.2 million asylum applications were filed in Europe.<\/p>\n

Agreements with Turkey, Libya, and Tunisia<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The most well-known agreement is the one between the European Union and Turkey, signed in March 2016. Turkish President Erdogan pledged to stop migrant departures to Greece in exchange for EU aid totaling \u20ac11.5 billion from 2016 to 2023 (according to European Court of Auditors estimates).<\/p>\n

While refugee arrivals in Greece dropped sharply\u2014from nearly 900,000 in 2015 to about 30,000 in 2016\u2014the treatment of Syrian refugees by the Turkish government was never seriously examined at the European level. Recently, it has emerged that EU funds likely financed policies involving the \u201cvoluntary\u201d repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Syrian territories under Turkish military control, a country still embroiled in civil war.<\/p>\n

Even more infamous for its blatant violations of migrant human rights is the memorandum of understanding signed with Libya by the Gentiloni government in 2017 and subsequently renewed every three years by all successive governments, regardless of political orientation. Entrusting a country in the midst of civil war with managing migration flows while expecting it to uphold human and asylum rights is a contradiction in terms. Evidence of violence, rape, and extortion against migrants in Libyan detention centers quickly surfaced, documented by media, humanitarian associations, and international organizations. Yet, migration flows from Libya to Italy decreased, and the agreement remains in force.<\/p>\n

On July 16, 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, promising \u20ac105 million for border management and \u20ac150 million for Tunisia\u2019s budget. In return, President Kais Saied\u2014known for his xenophobic views towards Sub-Saharan Africans\u2014pledged to halt departures to European shores. This agreement also \u201cworked.\u201d Landings in Italy dropped from 46,700 during May-July 2023 to 17,300 in the same period in 2024 (figure below). At the same time, reports emerged of migrants, including women and children, being deported and abandoned in the desert along the borders with Libya or Algeria.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Landings in Italy from the Central Mediterranean Route<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Source: IOM-DTM.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

 <\/p>\n

When Ethics Isn\u2019t Enough: Other Costs of Deterrence<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Deterrence shifts the problem over time: people are blocked in conditions worse than those that originally drove them to flee, but sooner or later, they will attempt the crossing anyway. It also shifts the problem geographically: the reduction in arrivals via one migration route might result either from people abandoning their journeys or resorting to alternative paths. Studies on the Mexico-U.S. border show significant shifts in flows toward less controlled areas. In Europe, ongoing research into the effects of the EU-Turkey agreement reveals that, in the six months following its implementation, between 30% and 60% of Asian migrants who would have used the Eastern Mediterranean route shifted to the Central Mediterranean. Over a longer time frame, it\u2019s likely that an even higher percentage opted for alternative routes.<\/p>\n

Then there\u2019s the diplomatic aspect: by signing agreements with unreliable partners with dubious democratic credentials, Europe not only legitimizes them politically but also exposes itself to blackmail based on threats to resume migrant flows. This risk isn\u2019t merely theoretical: both the Turkish and Tunisian governments have repeatedly used such threats. For instance, in 2019, when the European Union criticized Erdogan for occupying areas in Syria bordering Turkey, the Turkish president responded that he was ready to inundate Europe with over 3 million Syrian refugees.<\/p>\n

From a financial standpoint, these policies are also costly. Europe has spent \u20ac11.5 billion on the agreement with Turkey, plus \u20ac255 million on the one with Tunisia. Italy officially plans to spend \u20ac670 million on its agreement with Albania. Meanwhile, the total budget allocated for the European Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund for 2021-2027\u2014which finances not only reception and integration policies but also \u201ccooperation with third countries to combat irregular migration\u201d\u2014is \u20ac9.88 billion.<\/p>\n

The total amount spent on policies delegating border control to others\u2014whose results are questionable and often limited to redirecting migration flows to alternative routes\u2014is comparable to, or even exceeds, the budget allocated for integration policies. We might rhetorically ask which of these two budget lines offers greater returns to European citizens.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Francesco Fasani is a Full Professor of Economics at the University of Milan. He has taught in London and Barcelona and serves as a consultant on migration issues for major international organizations, including the World Bank and the European Commission.<\/em><\/p>\n

Tommaso Frattini is a Full Professor of Political Economy at the University of Milan. He coordinates the Migration Observatory at the Luca d\u2019Agliano Study Center and the Collegio Carlo Alberto and is co-director of the Global Migration Information Hub at the Rockwool Foundation Berlin.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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