{"id":870,"date":"2024-04-17T13:45:29","date_gmt":"2024-04-17T11:45:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/?p=870"},"modified":"2024-05-27T19:46:50","modified_gmt":"2024-05-27T17:46:50","slug":"european-central-bank-twenty-five-years-lived-dangerously","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rivistaeco.com\/en\/2024\/04\/17\/european-central-bank-twenty-five-years-lived-dangerously\/","title":{"rendered":"European Central Bank: Twenty-Five Years Lived Dangerously"},"content":{"rendered":"

The euro has now become a part of our everyday reality. Few remember the old Italian lira or the German mark. In the single currency\u2019s first quarter of a century, the ECB has had to face challenges far different from those predicted at the inception of the euro. And yet, it has emerged more mature.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

The old saying “generals always fight the last war” aptly describes the atmosphere that accompanied the preparations for the birth of the euro in the 1990s. The central issue at the time was how to conquer inflation, which, following the oil price spikes in the seventies and eighties, had reached over 20% in Italy as well as in other European countries. Looking back on the origins of the European Central Bank and reviewing the challenges it faced right from its very conception is useful in understanding just how much it has matured since then.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Bundesbank Model<\/b><\/h3>\n

During the years of high inflation, Germany was the only major country able to keep it under control. Moreover, German growth was stronger than in other countries. Many attributed this success (low inflation and high growth) to Bundesbank, the German central bank, which was free to conduct its monetary policy independently, as opposed to other European countries, notably Italy, in which the central bank operated under political control.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This gave rise to the idea of a <\/span>European Central Bank modeled on Bundesbank: independent and solely devoted to price stability<\/b>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several Italian economists contributed to the theoretical foundations of the monetary union. An example is an article by Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, who, as early as 1988, analyzed how “tying politicians’ hands” could be beneficial for monetary policy: political power always tends to look at short-term scopes and stimulates the economy with expansive policies, which ultimately prove ineffective as economic operators anticipate them. Whereas an independent central bank is free from political pressures and can maintain price stability.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECB was thus born<\/b> as an anti-inflation central bank, <\/span>a copy of Bundesbank<\/b>, completely independent from both national and European politics, with an explicit prohibition on financing national governments, but also with very limited powers: unlike today, it had no role in supervising the banking sector. At the time, few realized this gap could endanger the very existence of the new currency.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Consequences of German Unification<\/b><\/h3>\n

The early years of the euro \u2013 from 1999 to 2006-2007 \u2013 posed no particular problems to the ECB. This was also due to the fact that, during that period, inflation remained low almost worldwide. At the time, few realised that the calm in the markets and satisfactory growth were due to the availability of credit at low rates even to fragile debtors. A global credit bubble was inflating.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In order to understand how the euro crisis came to be, one must go back to the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The process of German unification generated a very significant imbalance in the European economy (an “asymmetric shock,” as economists say). The German economy, in fact, made a leap forward in the first years post unification, with a strong increase in consumption, thanks to the salaries and pensions of East Germany being immediately paid in Deutsch-Mark instead of Ost-Mark. The choice to convert the two currencies at a 1 to 1 rate multiplied the purchasing power of East Germany employees and pensioners, since, before reunification, the black market rate was four East Marks for one D-Mark. The building boom, both private and public, consequence of the need to modernize the infrastructure in East Germany, also increased inflationary pressure: it came to a halt in 1995, when Bundesbank dramatically raised rates to counter inflation. Even the German government had to tighten its belt, reducing subsidies for construction. However, as so many houses had been built during those years, the demand for new housing remained weak for a long period of time, until about 2005.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, as Germany navigated through a difficult period, most eurozone countries enjoyed the effects of the global credit boom, which made it easy to finance unprecedented real estate investments and trade deficits. Given the climate, no one was really concerned about Greece\u2019s public finances.<\/span><\/p>\n

Expectations vs Reality<\/b><\/h3>\n

At the birth of the euro, many thought Germany would suffer negatively from its introduction: more inflation was expected (the ECB would not be as tough on inflation as Bundesbank had been) as was less growth, given the German mark was overvalued in those years, as a consequence of the costs of unification. Indeed, Germany did experience a trade deficit in 1999-2000, the first after decades of surplus, a sign that the exchange rate at which the D-Mark had entered the euro posed a serious challenge to the competitiveness of the German industry.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Italy and other Mediterranean countries, however, expectations were quite the opposite: less inflation (the ECB was more credible, for example, than the Bank of Italy) and more growth, thanks to the exchange rates at which they had entered the euro and the more favorable interest rates for Italian businesses.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the euro\u2019s early years revealed a very different outcome. In Germany, unions accepted low wages, gradually restoring the German industry\u2019s competitiveness, while the stronger growth in the rest of the euro area led to an increase in local inflation. By 2007, Germany was back to a trade surplus equivalent to 5% of its GDP, while other countries\u2019 deficit \u2013 Spain, Greece, and Portugal \u2013 increased.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Financial markets were happy to finance these imbalances, and the eurozone economy seemed strong, with low average inflationary pressure since the relatively low inflation rates in Germany counterbalanced the higher ones elsewhere, especially in Southern European countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Great Financial Crisis<\/b><\/h3>\n

When the easy credit era ended, the great financial crisis erupted.<\/b><\/h3>\n

It all started in the United States, where many households had obtained mortgages despite being financially weak. Many of these so-called subprime mortgages had variable rates, and when the Federal Reserve raised rates in 2007, many families could no longer afford the interest payments. This led to a crisis in the subprime sector, which in turn disrupted the entire banking system that, based on those mortgages, had bet on complex financial instruments.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Europe, the onset of the crisis followed a similar path. The construction boom in Spain and Ireland ended abruptly, bringing the two countries to the brink of bankruptcy. However, the nature of the crisis changed as market attention shifted to other countries\u2019 public finances, specifically Italy\u2019s: it wasn\u2019t the construction sector to have triggered the crisis, as it hadn\u2019t inflated as in Ireland or Spain, but rather its significantly high public debt.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, there is a direct link between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the euro crisis, <\/b>for the birth of the single currency came at a peculiar time for the European economy due to the recent unification of Germany. The asymmetry caused by this momentous event would have created difficulties within the euro area anyway, even if it hadn\u2019t been for the global credit boom that ultimately multiplied its impact.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This mechanism was not recognized at the time; instead, the idea of thrifty Germans versus squandering Mediterraneans\u2019 took hold, with a particularly strong friction between Italy and Germany.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In those years, Italy saw Germany as the bringer of austerity and recession.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Germany, on the other hand, there was fear that the euro might devour German savings.<\/span><\/p>\n

A group of economics professors went so far as to found a new party \u2013 Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland (AfD) \u2013 to protect German savers from the ECB. Today’s AfD has lost its economic roots; the founding economics professors were ousted when the party was taken over by populists and nationalists who made immigration their top priority. But AfD certainly finds its origins in the euro crisis.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Its emergence represents only the tip of the iceberg. In those years, European economists were divided. For example, in 2010, a survey among the 200 most important professors in Germany resulted in 189 votes against the ECB’s intervention to save the euro and against the banking union. In Italy, 100 economists wrote an open letter against “the maneuver and the (European) austerity line.”\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Political tensions made the situation even more difficult for the ECB. The underlying fear was that the euro might shatter. It seems impossible today, but <\/span>at the time a majority in Germany still wanted to return to the old mark<\/b>: as clearly shown in figure 1. , this trend only reversed in 2011, only to decrease even further over time.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"The
How many would want to go back to the D-Mark? In percentage – Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfragen, n. 11010<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

2012: The Turning Point<\/b><\/h3>\n

Looking at Figure 1, it is interesting to note that 2012 represents the first year in which the pro-euro ideology prevails: it is the year in which the then President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, promised to do “whatever it takes” to save the single currency. Financial markets believed him mainly due to the implicit backing of then Chancellor Angela Merkel. Without this shift in German public opinion, it would have been very difficult for the chancellor to allow the ECB to implicitly breach the prohibition of financing struggling governments.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The entire European banking sector emerged battered from the great financial crisis. The recession in Italy, like in other Southern European countries, put heavy pressure on banks. As monetary policy necessarily works through the banking sector, the fact that banks remained under national control made the ECB’s job even more arduous. This led to the idea of placing about <\/span>one hundred large banks directly under Frankfurt’s supervision<\/b>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It was with these two steps \u2013 Mario Draghi’s intervention and the ECB’s banking supervision \u2013 that the acute phase of the euro crisis was overcome, and a sort of ECB 2.0 was born.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Nonetheless, even after the easing of financial tensions, the European economy remained very weak. <\/span>From 2012 onwards<\/b>, the ECB has had to do the opposite of what it was created for: fight deflation rather than maintain price stability<\/b>. Although low inflation was not a euro specific phenomenon, it was one of the most difficult problems to tackle for the ECB.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The European Central Bank is often criticized for having used tools like government bond purchases too late. But understanding its history also explains why it had to move so cautiously along its path.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Just as the European economy was gradually returning to normal, another unprecedented crisis appeared: the pandemic.<\/span><\/p>\n

From Covid to the Resurgence of Inflation<\/b><\/h3>\n

There’s another useful analogy borrowed from military history: the strongest armies are those with real combat experience. When the Covid-19 crisis struck in the spring of 2020, the ECB did not hesitate to use all the tools at its disposal to stabilize financial markets: it had learned that price stability cannot exist if the markets collapse.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, it was more difficult for the ECB to face the latest test, the one for which it was originally established: to tackle inflation and restore price stability.\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

The many years of significantly low inflation had nurtured the belief that even a spike in energy prices would not trigger a substantial inflationary process. This is probably why the ECB waited to raise rates until the summer of 2022, when inflation was already at 8. From that moment onwards, it has had to take cover from a flurry of increases. For the time being, it seems that inflation has receded. If this remains the case in the coming months, the ECB will have passed the test, albeit barely.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECB was not the only central bank to have a delayed reaction to the rise in inflation. However, given its clearly anti-inflationary mandate, it is quite surprising it did not do better than other central banks.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The ECB and euro\u2019s first quarter of a century was riddled with challenges far different from those that could have been foreseen at the conception of the single currency. But it is thanks to those challenges that a more mature institution has emerged, one that should be ready to face the equally unpredictable tasks of the next twenty-five years.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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